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The philosophy of mechanisms has developed 
rapidly during the last 30 years. As mechanisms-based 
explanations (MBEs) are often seen as an alternative 
to nomological, law-based explanations, MBEs could 
be relevant in IS. We begin by offering a short history 
of mechanistic philosophy and set out to clarify the 
contemporary landscape. We then suggest that 
mechanistic models provide an alternative to variance 
and process models in IS. Finally, we highlight how 
MBEs typically contain deliberate misrepresentations. 
Although MBEs have recently been advocated as 
critical realist (CR) accounts in IS, idealizations 
(deliberate misrepresentations) seem to violate some 
fundamental tenets of CR and research method 
principles for CR. Idealizations in MBEs, therefore, 
may risk being regarded as flawed in IS. If it turns out 
that CR cannot account for idealizations, naturalism 
can, and it does so without extra-philosophical 
baggage.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
In the philosophy of science, it was once widely 
assumed that scientific theories are comprised of laws: 
“A theory, as the term is actually used, is a set of laws” 
[1 p. 125]. The laws of nature were taken to be 
empirical and universal, i.e., unrestricted and 
exceptionless [2, 3]. Many philosophers argued that 
even the most “stable” biological theories, such as 
Darwin’s theory of evolution, are too dynamic, and 
contain too many exceptions to be called bona fide 
laws of nature [4]. What, then, do the life sciences 
study, if not laws? Scientists working in these fields 
commonly talk about “mechanisms” [5]. Mechanisms-
based explanations (MBEs) are not, however, peculiar 
to biology and biochemistry. More recently, some 
philosophers reported that psychologists commonly 
describe mechanisms [6]. As Weiskopf [7] notes: 
“Mechanistic explanation has an impressive track 
record of advancing our understanding of 
complex…systems.” Others reported that not only 
philosophy of biology but also “the philosophy of 
science more generally, should be restructured around 
the fundamental idea that many scientists organize 
their work around the search for mechanisms” [8].   
Mechanisms also hold promise for Information 
Systems (IS), for several reasons. First, a fundamental 
question is, what does the explanatory work in IS? One 
traditional answer is: laws. According to this view, IS 
models or theories “attempt to articulate a law” [9, p. 
iv, emphasis in original]. Alas, the concept of law faces 
many difficulties. Traditionally, “the word ‘laws’ has 
been reserved for universally applicable, exceptionless 
generalizations.” [3, p 371]. We hardly have such laws 
in IS. For example, consider ease of use, explaining IT 
use. This is not an exceptionless law in the sense of 
“all men are mortal”. MBEs offer an alternative to 
laws. MBEs, especially in the new mechanistic 
philosophy, are often distinguished from law-based 
explanations.  
Second, IS models are often divided into variance 
and process models [10]. Mechanisms seem to allow 
and, indeed, to explain alternative ways of modeling.   
Against this background, it is not surprising that the 
concept of mechanism has been introduced in the IS 
literature. Philosophically, mechanisms are conceived 
in IS as an interpretive account [11], and as a critical 
realist (CR) account [12, 13]. These seminal articles 
can be credited for bringing a philosophy of 
mechanisms into IS. At the same time, there is a risk 
that IS readers may confuse specific philosophical 
accounts¾and specific characterizations¾of 
mechanisms with 1) laws, 2) statistical generalizations 
in variance model settings IS, or 3) anything that can 
have a causal effect. Moreover, MBEs in IS may also 
be unduly limited to answering why-questions.  
Our first objective, in this article, is to untangle 
these possible confusions by showing that both the 
characteristics and the aims of MBEs, in the specific 






accounts of new mechanistic philosophy, are quite 
different from laws and statistical studies (variance 
models) as they are carried out in IS. Realizing this 
opens up new avenues for IS research, which could 
otherwise become unacceptable, because they do not 
meet existing IS conventions, such as laws, or variance 
models or process models. 
Our second goal is to stress that MBEs are not only 
incomplete representations. They may also contain 
deliberate, strategic misrepresentations. However, it 
remains debatable how major existing IS philosophical 
accounts can deal with the presence of deliberate 
misrepresentations in MBEs. Since we cannot examine 
all major IS “-isms” here (e.g., positivism and 
interpretivism), we focus on CR. We chose CR 
because MBEs have recently been advocated as CR 
accounts in IS, and IS readers are told that mechanistic 
philosophers have “embraced the philosophy of critical 
realism” [13]. Our interpretation of some major CR 
sources in IS suggests that idealization violates some 
CR tenets and research method principles for CR. To 
this end, we propose a different, and more promising 
naturalist approach. Our naturalist perspective 
recognizes the centrality¾indeed, the 
indispensability¾of idealization practices across all 
the natural and social sciences, IS included. As an 
added bonus, naturalism seems to avoid the extra-
philosophical baggage of CR, which some scholars 
may find problematic or unnecessary. 
  
2. A short (and incomplete) history and 
philosophy of mechanisms 
 
As Darden [14 p. 958] noted in 2008: “The new 
research program to understand mechanisms [...] has 
developed rapidly in the last 10 years.” After 2008, the 
understanding of MBEs has continued to develop. This 
is important, because the mechanistic movement in 
philosophy is sometimes presented, in IS, as a 
monolithic block. For example, Markus and Rowe 
[13], as well as Mingers and Standings [12, p. 175], 
generically refer to Salmon and Machamer et al.’s [15] 
mechanistic accounts without discussing some crucial 
differences among them. To be clear, this is not a 
critique of [12, 13]. However, a reader of [12] and [13] 
who is not familiar with the new mechanistic 
philosophy may get the misleading impression that 
these mechanistic accounts (e.g., Salmon vs. 
Machamer et al.) are, for all intents and purposes, 
identical. Explaining some differences across different 
mechanistic approaches is crucial to understanding 
MBEs. 
 
2.1. Laws and mechanisms 
 
Some IS mechanistic accounts [12] refer to Salmon. 
As we understand Salmon, the background of his view 
relates to the deductive-nomological (D-N) model [16]. 
Simply put, the D-N model purports to explain an 
observation by logically deducing it from laws and 
initial conditions. To illustrate, imagine that we 
observe a black raven. The observation of a black 
raven is called the explanandum, the event to be 
explained. The explanandum is explained by deducing 
it from an explanans, what explains the explanandum. 
Within the D-N model, the explanans is comprised of a 
true general law—All ravens are black—and the 
appropriate initial conditions: this is a raven. 
According to the D-N model, a scientific explanation 
answers why questions [16]. (However, the why-
question thesis is not D-N specific.) An explanans 
explains a why explanandum. In other words, given the 
explanans, the explanandum is expected nomically 
(because it is a law!), and it is not a coincidence [16]. 
In short, one asks, “Why is this bird black?” The D-N 
answer is: “It is a raven, and all ravens are black” [17 
p. 339]; i.e., a raven is black, because it is the law that 
all ravens are black. 
von Wright [18 p. 19] had a concern: “a law stating 
the universal concomitance of the two characteristics 
raven-hood and blackness” is not an adequate 
explanation. This is because “We should like to know 
why ravens are black, what it is about them that ‘is 
responsible for’ the color which, so we are told, is 
characteristic of them all” [18 p. 19]. von Wright’s 
“why question” concern is helpful for understanding 
Salmon’s [19] causal mechanical model of explanation. 
Salmon [20 p. 708] asked, “What does scientific 
explanation offer?” His answer was: “mechanisms of 
production and propagation.” A mechanism “yields 
scientific understanding” [20 p. 708]. For Salmon, 
“this is what we seek when we pose explanation-
seeking why questions” [20 p. 708]. He recognized that 
the D-N explanation fails to provide this kind of 
understanding. Similarly, Railton [21] regarded D-N 
explanations as “incomplete” or “unsatisfactory,” 
“unless we can back them up with an account of the 
mechanism(s) at work” [21, p. 208]. As Wright and 
Bechtel [22] note, Salmon’s causal mechanical model 
of explanation focuses on causation, rather than 
mechanisms. Specifically, for Salmon [19 p. 121], “[t]o 
provide an explanation of a particular event is to 
identify the cause and, in many cases at least, to exhibit 
the causal relation between this event and the event-to-
be-explained.” According to Salmon, explaining a 
certain event traces the causal processes (and 
interactions) that lead up to this event.  
In sum, on our interpretation, Salmon [19, 20] and 
Railton [21] linked mechanisms to laws. We return to 
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this issue in section 3.2. In the meanwhile, let us ask 
how Salmon’s account can be applied in IS. The IS 
mechanisms articles we discuss here that cited Salmon 
(e.g., [12, 13]) do not discuss (the applicability of) 
Salmon’s [19] causal nexus, which is a physical 
network (consisting of causal interactions and causal 
processes), in IS. Such interaction is causal if it is 
capable of transmitting a mark. It is questionable 
whether such an approach fits IS. For example, how 
does any IS phenomenon meet Salmon’s [19] 
definition of mark transmission, or consumed quantity? 
Salmon’s idea of physical networks seems largely 
irrelevant and inapplicable to IS. One option is to omit 
the details of Salmon’s specific concepts, and just 
regard mechanisms as “a chain of [a] web of event[s] 
leading to [a] particular event” [23 p. S346]. 
 
2.2. Deviation from laws 
 
Craver and Tabery [7] reported that the new 
mechanical philosophy started with Bechtel and 
Richardson [24]. It seems safe to say that Salmon and 
Railton were inspired by the weaknesses of the D-N 
model, and assumed laws. Many writers in new 
mechanical philosophy, in contrast separated 
mechanisms from laws. Bechtel and Richardson [24] 
viewed mechanisms as machines: “A machine is a 
composite of interrelated parts, each performing its 
own functions, that are combined in such a way that 
each contributes to producing a behavior of the system. 
A mechanistic explanation identifies these parts and 
their organization, showing how the behavior of the 
machine is a consequence of the parts and their 
organization.”  
Many recent accounts of mechanisms seem to omit 
or downplay the “machine” connection (see below). 
Glennan [25 p. 54] regards mechanisms as complex 
systems: “A mechanism underlying a behavior is a 
complex system which produces that behavior by the 
interaction of a number of parts according to direct 
causal laws.” Later, in 2002, Glennan [23 p. S345] 
noted that as in philosophical vernacular “laws must be 
exceptionless,” he omitted the laws. Glennan [23] 
regarded other recent mechanisms accounts – such as 
Bechtel and Richardson [24] and Machamer et al. [15] 
– as a complex systems approaches, which Salmon’s 
and Railton’s approaches are not, per Glennan [23]. 
 
2.3. Activities and entities 
 
Machamer, Darden and Craver focused on 
mechanisms as they are used by scientists: 
“Mechanisms are composed of both entities (with their 
properties) and activities. Activities are the producers 
of change. Entities are the things that engage in 
activities” [15 p. 3]. Many other mechanistic accounts 
[14, 26] also regarded mechanisms as composed of 
entities and activities: “Activities are the things that 
entities do... Activities are the causal components of 
mechanisms” [26 p. 371]. Darden [14] offered an 
"updated" account of [15], where the activity produces 
the change.  
Machamer et al. [15 p. 3] found the reliance on 
“law” in Glennan’s [25] mechanisms accounts 
problematic. In life sciences such as biology, 
Glennan’s “direct causal laws” cannot capture how 
activities operate, and “leave out the productive nature 
of activities.”1 As a result, Glennan's 2002 account [23] 
omitted laws. Railton’s [21 p. 208] mechanisms also 
backed up laws. Thus, it is questionable how this 
approach can accommodate mechanisms in IS. 
 
2.5. Mechanistic-based models must idealize 
 
It was once widely believed in the philosophy of 
science that scientific theories or models correspond to 
real phenomena, and the theories were evaluated 
against real-life observations [27]. According to this 
once-received view, in the case of the law “all ravens 
are black,” raven and black refer to “real world” 
features, and the law is tested with observations of 
“real” ravens to see if all ravens are black.  
Since the early 1980s, it has become common to 
note how scientific models misrepresent the assumed 
"real" world characteristics [27]. For example, a 
(mechanistic) model “deliberately abstracts away from 
and idealizes known details for the sake of simplicity 
and perspicuity” [28, p. 769]. As a result, in 
mechanistic models “the causal relations responsible 
for the explanandum [phenomena] are deliberately 
misrepresented on a regular basis” [28, p. 764]. Such 
idealization, the introduction of deliberate 
misrepresentations, is a necessary practice [28, p. 764]. 
One, prominent reason is that the real world is too 
complex to handle without idealizations: 
The cell and its myriad constituents compose an 
extremely sophisticated apparatus; a realistic 
representation of this plethora of entities and 
interactions—assuming that such a “complete” 
depiction is even feasible—would make the 
description impractical and the explanation 
unilluminating. [28, p. 764]  
 
                                               
1 “Descriptions of mechanisms render the end stage intelligible by 
showing how it is produced by bottom out entities and activities. To 
explain is not merely to redescribe one regularity as a series of 
several. Rather, explanation involves revealing this productive 
relation. It is not the regularities that explain but the activities that 
sustain the regularities” [15, pp. 21–22]. 
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3. Mechanisms in IS: Some Clarifications 
 
After our short and partial review of the history and 
philosophy of mechanisms, we now discuss several 
potential sources of the confusion an IS reader may 
face when reading some of the relevant IS literature. 
 
3.1. Why or how questions? 
 
Avgerou [11 p. 400] reported that “[e]explanatory 
theory addresses why and how observed 
phenomenon[a] occur.” Following Salmon [20] and 
Railton [21] (section 2), Mingers and Standings [12] 
and Markus and Rowe [13] claim that MBE answer 
why questions. “[S]cientific realists embrace the task 
of explaining why things happen (…) The name they 
give to the hidden connection is mechanism” [13]. 
According to Mingers and Standings [12, p. 178], 
MBEs answer, “Why did Z happen and not something 
else?” [12 p. 178]. As we understand them, Mingers 
and Standings [12, p. 178], maintain that answering 
why questions makes the mechanism causal. However, 
some of the mechanisms articles (e.g., Machamer et al. 
[15]) cited by Markus and Rowe [13] and Mingers and 
Standings [12]) stress that mechanisms, instead, 
answer how questions: “[m]echanisms are sought to 
explain how a phenomenon comes about or how some 
significant process works” [15 p. 1]. As Thagard [29] 
explained: 
How questions [...] are best answered by specifying 
one or more mechanisms understood as organized 
entities and activities […] Thus answering a how-
question is not a matter of assembling discrete 
arguments that can provide the answer to individual 
why-questions, but rather requires specification of a 
complex mechanism consisting of many parts and 
interconnections. [29 p. 251] 
 
Thagard’s [29] point could be relevant in IS. MBEs 
are not restricted to answering why or “why and how” 
[11 p. 400] questions. MBEs can also answer how-
questions, and, perhaps, other questions too. 
Nevertheless, perhaps we should not limit a priori 
which type of questions MBEs can answer. 
 
3.2. Mechanisms, laws, or anything that can 
have a causal effect 
 
An IS source [12 p. 172] stated that “[i]n fact, 
[mechanisms are] anything that can be thought to have 
causal effects in the world.” This claim requires 
clarification. On the one hand, philosophers have 
characterized mechanisms in various, alternative ways. 
In 1978, Railton [21 p. 208] (in a paper not cited by 
[11]) noted: “An account of the mechanism(s) is a 
vague notion.” On the other hand, many mechanistic 
philosophers, cited by [12 p. 175], would deny that 
mechanisms are anything that can have causal effects. 
This is important, because IS readers may learn from a 
seminal paper [12] that Salmon and Machamer et al. 
[15] held this view. However, for example, per [15 p. 
3], “mechanisms are entities and activities organized 
such that they are productive of regular changes from 
start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.”   
A critique or endorsement of Machamer et al.’s 
[15] account of mechanisms lies beyond our present 
purposes. Our point is simply to note some difficulties 
in applying their views to IS. For example, they stated 
that a “mechanism is the series of activities of entities 
that bring about the finish or termination conditions in 
a regular way” [15 p. 7]. Elsewhere, they noted, “they 
[mechanisms] work always or for the most part in the 
same way under the same conditions.” [15 p. 3]. Many 
cancer or IS mechanisms do not meet the criterion of 
“regular changes,” nor do “they work always or for the 
most part in the same way under the same conditions.” 
In fact, Bogen [30] suggested omitting the concept 
“regular,” because mechanisms can operate at irregular 
intervals. In addition, Wright and Bechtel [22 p. 31] 
noted that “[w]ith complex feedback loops, the 
mechanism can begin to behave in unexpected ways.” 
Later, Darden [14], one of the authors of [15], seemed 
to agree with this. Darden [14] emphasized the 
importance of productivity over regularity.  
Nevertheless, we want to highlight that many 
mechanisms philosophers (e.g., cited by [12]) 
characterize mechanisms differently from each other. It 
is important to stress (and not to ignore) these 
differences. One fundamental difference is that for 
Glennan (1996 [25], but not 2002 [23]), Salmon’s [e.g., 
19, 20] and Railton’s [21] mechanisms play a 
supplementary role in law-based accounts in one way 
or the other. For example, for Railton [21], 
mechanisms back up laws. However, for many 
prominent “new mechanism” philosophers (e.g., 
Bechtel, Craver, and Darden), the law connection 
hardly applies. Consider Craver and Bechtel [31 p. 
473], for example: “It is not laws that do the 
explanatory work but the account of the operation of 
the mechanism.” The point of, e.g., Bechtel, Craver, 
and Darden is that MBEs in life sciences and social 
sciences do not act as supplements to laws. Instead, 
mechanistic explanations are, typically, alternatives to 
laws. Making this distinction is important for IS.  
 
3.3. The ontic conception to explanation 
 
Many forms of realism assume an ontic conception 
of explanation, where scientific explanations are not 
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mental representations, but things in the world. For 
example, Craver’s [32 p. 27] view, according to which 
MBEs refer to “objective features of the world,” is 
ontic. It appears that some of the IS philosophy of 
mechanisms also subscribes to some ontic conception. 
According to Markus and Rowe [13], “[m]echanisms 
are conceptualized as (1) ontologically real, even if 
they are unobservable… and (3) able to produce effects 
that would not happen otherwise.” Similarly, Mingers 
and Standing [12 p. 172] noted, “[i]n fact, 
[mechanisms are] anything that can be thought to have 
causal effects in the world.” Finally, Avgerou [11 p. 
400] observed that “[e]xplanatory theory addresses 
why and how observed phenomenon occur.”  
We argue that many seminal mechanism accounts 
in IS [e.g., 11, 12, 13] have difficulty accounting for 
deliberate misrepresentations (idealizations), common 
in mechanistic models. Similar to Love and Nathan 
[28, p. 764], we see such a misrepresentation as (1) 
typical, (2) necessary, and (3) (should be) strategic. IS 
views, like the ontic conception, seem to be 
incompatible with deliberate misrepresentations, 
which, in the words of Love and Nathan [28], 
“fictionalizes in the service of simplification.” 
Provided that mechanistic models purposefully 
misrepresent phenomena, these models do not 
represent “objective features,” “ontologically real” 
mechanisms or “how observed phenomenon occur,” as 
claimed by many seminal IS articles [11, 12, 13]. 
Consider, Markus and Rowe’s [12] view: “The 
position statement for causal mechanism can be 
phrased as follows: Causality involves real physical, 
psychological, and/or social processes that connect 
inputs and outputs under certain conditions” [13]. 
However, in mechanistic models, the “causal relations 
that produce the explanandum are idealized in 
mechanistic diagrams; their representation 
intentionally ignores known variations in properties 
and other components that make an actual difference” 
[28, p. 768]. Then, because the mechanistic accounts 
are idealized, “they do not show how the mechanism 
actually works” [28, p. 768]. If we are correct that the 
seminal mechanism philosophy accounts [11, 12, 13] 
cannot account for deliberate misrepresentations, this 
observation is important for the following reason. If 
misrepresentations are not recognized, there is a risk 
that they are deemed flaws in MBEs.  
 
3.4. So-called variance models versus 
mechanisms-based explanations 
 
According to Rivard [10 p. ix], “[m]ost theoretical 
models that are developed in the IS domain are either 
variance or process models.” A variance or process is 
based on Mohr [33], as noted by Burton-Jones, 
McLean, and Monod [34]. Two questions arise: 1) 
What relationships do variance and process have with 
mechanistic models? 2) Can mechanistic models offer 
something that variance or process cannot? Let us first 
look at the so-called variance IS models [34].  
A good candidate for a variance model in IS is the 
technology acceptance model (TAM) [35]. Davis [35 
p. 319] called ease of use and usefulness “fundamental 
determinants of user acceptance [of IT].” In these so-
called ”variance” models in IS, typically, each 
relationship is presented as a statistical hypothesis, 
which is tested with statistical techniques. The TAM is 
a case in point. This model examines relationships 
between independent variables (ease of use and 
perceived usefulness) and the dependent variable (e.g., 
IT use or intention to use IT) statistically. Interestingly, 
Avgerou [11] provided a “well known example” of the 
mechanisms in IS. It “is the explanation of people’s 
intention to use IT in terms of their perception of its 
usefulness and ease of use” [11 p. 408]. Avgerou [11] 
referred to Davis’s [35] TAM.  
Does the TAM in Davis’s [35] work offer a 
mechanism-based explanation, as implied by Avgerou 
[11]? This ultimately depends on how we characterize 
mechanisms. Avgerou’s [11] mechanism account also 
referred to Machamer et al. [15]. If, by mechanisms, 
we have in mind something along the lines of 
Machamer et al. [15], or a later commentary [14], then 
we suggest that TAM is not a mechanistic account. We 
argue that the aim of TAM [35] is to demonstrate a 
statistically significant relationships between 
independent variables (perceived ease of use and 
perceived usefulness) and a dependent variable (e.g., 
IT use). The aim is some kind of statistical explanation, 
and statistical generalizations. Recall Machamer et al. 
[15 p. 3]: “Mechanisms are entities and activities 
organized such that they are productive of regular 
changes from start or set-up to finish or termination 
conditions.” The focus of the TAM [35] is neither 
examining (1) the setup to finish or termination 
conditions nor (2) regular changes, not even changes. 
An important objective of TAM [35], and this may 
apply widely in so-called variance IS models is a 
statistical generalization. In other words, the key aim 
of the statistical part is generally to demonstrate 
statistical generalization, where one “observes a 
characteristic of a sample of a population and then 
infers that the population itself has that characteristic, 
within a margin of error” [36 p. 18]. Generally, the aim 
of statistical generalization in IS seems to be different 
from examining regularity, still less regular changes. 
Darden's [14] follow-up of [15] changed regularity 
with productivity. According to Machamer et al. [15], 
mechanisms produce the phenomenon: “Giving a 
description of mechanism for a phenomenon is to 
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explain that phenomena and its production” (p. 3). One 
can also question whether such productivity, as 
characterized by [14; 15], is a key goal in TAM. For 
Davis [35 p. 320], ease of use means “the degree to 
which a person believes that using a particular system 
would be free of effort.” Davis [35] measured a belief, 
rather than explaining what produces the phenomenon 
of IT use or how a certain task is carried out. TAM 
does not explain at all what system characteristics 
constitute “ease of use.” Hence, TAM does not really 
explain the production of IT use, or how the task 
resulting in IT use is carried out, in terms of Machamer 
et al. [15][14]. 
We highlight three takeaways. (1) The so-called 
variance models may not be mechanistic models, if 
mechanisms are defined as by [15; 14]. (It is possible, 
however, that TAM might meet some other definition 
of mechanisms.) This is because a key goal of variance 
models, such as TAM, is statistical generalizability, 
rather than regularity or productivity. (2) Nevertheless, 
the variance models could offer useful information on 
the generalizability of some aspects of mechanisms. 
We say ”some” aspects, because translating the 
mechanisms model to statistical studies tends to 
misrepresent the mechanisms. (3) Mechanistic models 
allow an examination of complex changes and 
reticulated connections, which variance model settings 
have difficulty accommodating. Reticulated means that 
the connections can dynamically change. Let us 
assume that a mechanism has only seven parts (A, B, 
C, D, E, F, and G). First, something takes place from A 
to B, from B to C, and so on, up to G. However, the 
next time things can happen from A to C, and then to 
B, and from B to E, and so on. Next, we examine to 
what extent process models in IS allow complexity and 
reticulated connections.  
 
3.6. Process models and mechanistic models 
 
According to Mohr [33 p. 44], “[l]oosely process 
theory is one that tells a little story about how 
something comes about”. This sounds somewhat like a 
mechanism. However, for Mohr [33], this 
characterization of "process" was not satisfactory: “in 
order to qualify as a theoretical explanation…, the 
manner of storytelling must conform to narrow 
specifications” [33 p. 44]. As a result, Mohr [33 p. 44] 
gave process theory “a highly specific meaning.” 
These “narrow specifications” include that “the basis 
of the explanation is probabilistic rearrangement,” “a 
processes theory deals with a final cause,” and 
“events,” yet “the precursor (X) is a necessary 
condition for the outcome” [33 p. 44]. However, 
mechanisms (as defined by e.g., [14; 15]) are not 
necessarily event based. In addition, it is questionable 
whether mechanistic models [e.g., 14; 15] generally 
meet the requirements of necessary conditions. For 
example, mechanistic models are often idealized, and 
seldom complete [28]. They do not necessarily deal 
with final causes. With mechanistic models such as 
[e.g., 14, 15], the mechanism (and its part, e.g., 
activities) is “the basis of explanation.” Regardless, 
with mechanistic models [e.g., 14, 15], Mohr’s [33] 
probabilistic rearrangement may not be required. In 
short, it can be seen that process models, as defined by 
Mohr [33], are importantly different from mechanistic 
models (in the sense of what, e.g., [14] or [15] assign 
to mechanisms). To be sure, we do not claim that no 
mechanistic model can meet Mohr's [33] process. Our 
point is that one can imagine MBEs, which do not 
qualify as process theories, according to Mohr [33]. 
Therefore, many of Mohr’s [33] requirements ("narrow 
specifications”) for process seem too restrictive, and 
seem not to allow reticulated connections. 
 
4. An IS example of deliberate 
misrepresentation 
 
In this section, we examine an example of MBEs in 
IS. The example is a qualitative CR case study by 
Henfridsson and Bygstad [37]. We present only part of 
the study [37]. The authors [37] proposed three digital 
infrastructure mechanisms: innovation, scaling, and 
adoption, of which we present two (Fig. 1). We 
propose the interpretation that the mechanisms by [37] 
are, in fact, idealized. By idealized, we mean that the 
mechanisms contain deliberate misrepresentations of 
the assumed "real" phenomenon or what explains it. To 
be clear, this is not a critique of [37]. Au contraire, 
their models are excellent examples of idealization 
(deliberate misrepresentations). Henfridsson and 
Bygstad [37] follow CR. We then ask: how does CR 
account for the deliberate misrepresentations? Asking 
this question is important because, if 
misrepresentations are not recognized, there is a risk 
that they are deemed flaws in MBEs. We next discuss 









Figure 1. The mechanisms of innovation and 
adoption [37 p. 919]. 
The authors presented these mechanisms 
separately, for analytical reasons [37 p. 918]. In what 


















adoption, although we maintain that our general point 
equally applies to the other two mechanisms. These 
mechanisms (Fig 1) are presented as “self-reinforcing” 
and recursive, in the sense that each mechanism 
“recursively feeds on itself" [37 p. 911].  
We propose the following. Contra Henfridsson and 
Bygstad [37], the mechanism of adoption is hardly a 
“self-reinforcing process” which “recursively feeds on 
itself,” at least when these claims are taken at face 
value. First, it is not always the case that the more 
services are offered, the more users adopt them. 
Similarly, it is not always true that “with more users 
adopting the infrastructure services, more resources 
were allocated to improve and extend the 
infrastructure” [37 p. 919]. There are obvious 
exceptions. Second, even if we accept, for the sake of 
the argument, that the cycle-recursive process takes 
place in ”real” settings, it still would not be self-
reinforcing and recursive for an infinite period: At 
some point, we would run out of users, resources, or 
both. Third, more services offered is the starting point 
for the adoption mechanisms, and new services are the 
outcome of innovation mechanisms [37 p. 918]. 
Furthermore, “the adoption mechanisms provided the 
financial resources to maintain the innovation 
mechanisms” [37 p. 918]. What this point shows is that 
these mechanisms mutually interact, which, taken 
literally, runs contrary to the claim by Henfridsson and 
Bygstad [37] that these cycles are individually “self-
reinforcing processes” or “recursive.”. Fourth, and 
finally, Henfridsson and Bygstad [37 p. 918] referred 
to the Internet strategy, which presumably 
encompasses various other aspects, in addition to 
“more services offered.” To illustrate, it seems 
plausible to assume that if the systems were difficult to 
use, then users may feel less inclined to use them. But 
then, “more services offered” is not the only difference 
maker. Service quality, marketing tactics, and 
competitors’ offerings can all play a role here, 
interacting with more services offered, in the 
explanation of use. 
In sum, far from being excruciatingly realistic, the 
models in Fig. 1 seem to contain idealizations 
(deliberate misrepresentations). The authors [37] 
themselves seemed to be aware of this to some extent. 
They “acknowledge that the granularity of our analysis 
of causality is at a relatively high level, suggesting the 
existence of nested causal paths in digital infrastructure 
evolution left unaddressed in this study. Thus, we do 
not claim that we have discovered all of the 
mechanisms relevant for infrastructure evolution” [37 
p. 928]. We want to advance the interpretation that 
they [37] deliberately misrepresented the mechanisms 
of adoption.  
[37] was published in the MIS Quarterly special 
issue on CR, and discussed by [11] as a paradigmatic 
CR study. This study, as stated by the authors, “adopts 
a critical realist view” [37 p. 907-908, p. 910] in the 
sense of Bhaskar. CR “defends a strongly realist 
ontology that there is an existing, causally efficacious, 
world independent of our knowledge” [38 p. 795]. “CR 
recognizes,” Mingers et al. [38] continued, “that our 
access to this world is in fact limited and always 
mediated by our perceptual and theoretical lenses. It 
accepts epistemic relativity (that knowledge is always 
local and historical), but not judgmental relativity (that 
all viewpoints must be equally valid)” [38, p. 795]. 
Similarly, the CR case study principles reported that 
“scientific research must revolve around the 
independent reality that comprises the world, even 
though humans are usually unable to fully understand 
or observe this reality, and that our knowledge of 
reality is fallible” [39 p. 789].  
Could CR theses account for the misrepresentations 
(Fig. 1)? A full review of CR is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Thus, we focus on some CR theses (e.g., 
fallibilism, theory-ladennes, realist ontology) in major 
IS sources [11; 38; 39]. First, the fallibilism of 
scientific knowledge [38]. The idea that scientific 
theories are always revisable, and thus, can never be 
shown to be absolutely true, is a popular stance. Thus, 
is not CR specific, and it is not about idealizations. We 
know that mechanisms of adoption (Fig. 1) are not 
known to be true with absolute certainty. Nonetheless, 
such mechanism is not currently being rejected or 
revised. In addition, theory-ladenness is not unique to 
CR per se. It is a well-known feature of science, widely 
accepted across many philosophical systems. Theory-
ladenness is not about deliberate misrepresentations. It 
is the idea that observation in science heavily depends 
on the theoretical background at play. Idealizations, 
however, can be broadly defined as the deliberate 
distortion of detail in a model, a sort of fictionalization 
in the service of simplification.  
This leads to the question of which theses are 
germane to CR? One plausible answer is the “strongly 
realist ontology” advocated by Mingers et al. [38]. But, 
note, the “strong realism” is difficult to reconcile with 
the idea of idealization in scientific models. Consider 
the following criterion of CR case study principles: CR 
“seeks to posit descriptions of reality,” where the 
“resulting knowledge claims are focused on specifying 
and describing those elements of reality which must 
exist in order for the events and experiences under 
examination to have occurred” [39 p. 793]. However, 
the mechanisms in [37] in Fig. 1 may not accomplish 
this requirement, due to idealizations. Moreover, given 
the deliberate omission and misrepresentation of detail, 
it becomes difficult to maintain that the model depicted 
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in Fig. 1 is a “concrete systems that makes it what it is” 
[37 p. 911]. 
Finally, according to CR case study principles [39], 
“a proposed mechanism "must survive an empirical 
test...where survival is indicated by the observation of 
evidence consistent with what the theory predicts" (Lee 
and Hubona 2009)” [39 p. 801]. According to CR case 
study principles, prediction is commonly replaced with 
explanation [39]. Generally, many idealizations have 
difficulty meeting the aforementioned empirical test. 
Henfridsson and Bygstad’s research question [37] is 
“which mechanisms contingently cause the evolution 
of digital infrastructure, is partially geared toward 
defining what constitutes a digital infrastructure” [37 p. 
911]. But these mechanistic models (Fig. 1) hardly 
“contingently cause the evolution of digital 
infrastructure” [37 p. 911]. We mentioned possible 
observations that are inconsistent with what the models 
explain (Fig 1). While we are not criticizing the 
Henfridsson and Bygstad [37] study, the causality 
attributed to CR research by CR methodological 
principles is also hard to meet.2  
Our takeaway is the following. First, theory-
ladenness, human biases, and the thesis that scientific 
knowledge is fallible are important ideas, but they are 
different from and independent of idealizations. 
Second, as we understand CR [37, 38] and CR case 
study principles [39], they both have difficulty 
accounting for idealizations. Furthermore, CR case 
study principles seem to ban idealizations: “Ensure 
causal factors are not idealizations” [39 p. 802]. We 
find this problematic, because virtually all scientific 
studies idealize. Failure to understand idealization 
leads to more trouble. CR case study principles hold 
that “contrary findings would possibly lead to further 
explication of events, structure and context, as well as 
additional retroduction to identify a mechanism acting 
to counter or nullify the proposed explanation” [39 p. 
801]. However, this may not happen in the case of 
MBEs in scientific practice: “Even when the relevant 
details are known, researchers do not replace idealized 
causal relations with more accurate or realistic 
representations” [28, p. 769]. The point is that “the 
gradual elimination of idealized diagrams is rarely—if 
ever—witnessed in scientific practice” [28 p. 769]. 
Given the possible CR problems with idealizations, 
                                               
2 CR assumes causality in research models “if and only if it is the 
case that some event E would not have occurred, under the 
conditions that actually prevailed but for (the operation of) X” 
(Bhaskar 1998, p. 101)” [39 p. 789]. Consider also, “why did Z 
happen and not something else? To answer this we have to examine 
the characteristics and properties of the mechanisms that are 
involved in the events so that we can explain the particular event as 
following from the causal powers of these mechanisms. This is 
generative or mechanism causality” [12, p. 178]. 
what are the other options? One option is naturalism, 
which we briefly introduce next. 
 
4.1. Critical realists or naturalists? 
 
Readers of the philosophy of mechanisms in IS [12, 
13] may have inferred that various mechanistic 
accounts in the philosophy of science are explicitly or 
implicitly committed to CR3. However, the extent to 
which many of the neo-mechanistic philosophers 
mentioned by Markus and Rowe [13] and Mingers and 
Standing [12] are actually committed to CR is 
questionable, to say the least. For example, Markus and 
Rowe [13] cited Hedström and Ylikoski [40] as 
evidence that the proponents of mechanisms 
“embraced the philosophy of critical realism.” 
However, Hedström and Ylikoski [40 pp. 56–57] 
offered a critique of CR. For them [40 p. 57], CR 
carries “extra philosophical baggage that we may want 
to avoid.” [40 p. 57]. They continued that “the 
development of critical realism also seems to have 
stalled” [40 p. 57]. Later, Ylikoski [41 p. 334] reported 
that “critical realism seems to have some worrisome 
features.” Thus, on one hand, it is not clear to us what 
value CR-specific theses add for the Henfridsson and 
Bygstad [37] CR study. (As mentioned, assuming 
theory-ladenness and the fallibilism of scientific 
knowledge do not require one to commit to CR at all.) 
On the other hand, we wonder whether the 
idealizations, such as by [37] (cf. Fig 1), violate certain 
CR theses and CR case study principles [39]. Although 
CR advocates in IS often compare CR with 
interpretivism and positivisms [38, 39], there are other 
alternatives.  
For understanding mechanisms, we argue, it is 
important to consult critically how mechanisms are 
successfully used in sciences, and build the 
philosophizing from there. This approach is often 
referred to as practice-based philosophy, or naturalism. 
In fact, many contemporary mechanisms philosophers 
cited by [12, 13] refer to themselves as ”naturalists” or 
”practice-based philosophers” [14, 15, 42, 43]. To be 
sure, naturalism is not a homogenous movement [43]. 
However, an important point shared by many 
naturalists is a rejection of the idea of a priori 
philosophizing. Thagard [43 p. 249] thought that 
“naturalists agree that progress in philosophy requires 
close attention to scientific developments”. Bechtel 
                                               
3 “The causal mechanism concept evolved somewhat independently 
in two intellectual communities, scientific realism and sociology, 
that appear to be converging under the banner of critical realism 
(Hedström and Ylikoski 2010)” [13]. Elsewhere, [13] also noted that 
“proponents of social mechanisms appear to have embraced the 
philosophy of critical realism...as a foundation for their theorizing 
(Hedström and Ylikoski 2010)” [13]. 
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[42] said, “[p]hilosophers of science adopting a 
naturalistic perspective often present themselves as 
investigating the domain of science in the manner in 
which scientists investigate phenomena in their own 
domains of inquiry” (p. 2). This is, roughly speaking, 
what we mean by naturalism. It is an attempt to 
understand the mechanisms used by scientists, without 
imposing “extra philosophical baggage” [40]. 
Naturalism does not have to be dogmatic toward 
scientific practice. Because naturalism avoids imposing 
a priori concepts from philosophy on actual scientific 
practice, it allows IS scholars some freedom to propose 




Scholars [e.g., 11, 12, 13, 39, 40] have increased 
our understanding of mechanisms in IS. We suggested 
a distinction between (1) laws, (2) variance models 
aimed at statistical explanations and statistical 
generalizations, and (3) some mechanistic accounts 
[e.g., 14; 15], for the following reasons. Universal laws 
do not allow dynamics and change (e.g., reticulated 
connections). In addition, variance models may aim for 
statistical generalizations. Although useful, variance 
models in IS may not be well suited for understanding 
a highly dynamic phenomenon. Moreover, statistical 
generalizations for IS may not be aimed at showing 
“productivity.” In turn, Mohr’s [41] process contained 
characteristics that may limit dynamic and reticulated 
theorizing. MBEs may help here by allowing the 
modeling of a complex and reticulated phenomenon, 
for example, with pathway modeling. Furthermore, 
mechanistic models are idealized (contain purposeful 
misrepresentations) for strategic reasons. Assuming 
that IS phenomena are not much more stable and 
simpler than biological or economical phenomena, 
even the most detailed mechanistic models in IS will 
most likely be idealizations, too. If so, “[t]he goal of 
[a] mechanistic explanation is not an all-inclusive 
single model but a series of many complementary 
diagrams and descriptions comprising different 
idealizations” [28, p. 772]. Such a multi-model strategy 
could also be useful in IS. Mechanistic models tend to 
idealize, but idealizations may not be considered part 
of standard scientific practice in major accounts of 
MBEs in IS. As result, there could be a risk that 
idealizations end up criticized as a flaw in IS, and IS 
authors may have to claim that idealizations 
correspond to the assumed reality. The latter case may 
result in some IS scholars and practitioners confusing 
idealized mechanistic models with assumed “real” 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, future IS philosophy is 
needed to understand MBEs more. Naturalism offers 
one alternative. It may be a good alternative, especially 
if it turns out that CR, positivism, and interpretivism 
cannot do justice to idealizations. 
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